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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROLAND LAVAR DENISON, 
Appellant, 
— vs. — 
ALVIN D, CHAPMAN, 
et al , 
Respondents 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action is to recover for damages to property and 
for personal injuries sustained by appellant in a collision 
of his station wagon, traveling south in the west outside 
land of a four lane highway, with a semi-trailer oil truck, 
which was traveling north with another automobile, with 
the result that the semi-trailer crossed over the highway 
into the lanes of southbound traffic and directly in front 
of the station wagon. 
The semi-trailer was owned by Continental Oil Com-
pany and was being driven by its employee, Alvin D, 
No. 8554 
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Chapman- The third car was being driven by Dora Hart-
ley. 
The accident occurred the evening of February 22, 
1955, on U. S. Highway 89-91, at about 20 North Street, 
in Provo, on the hill which forms the north bank of the 
Provo River approach. This is a four lane paved highway 
with gravel shoulders and guard rails on both sides. It is 
68 feet wide between the guard rails. 
Denison was driving south from Orem toward Provo. 
He slowed down to about 15 miles per hour as he ap-
proached the crest of the hill and did not increase his 
speed thereafter. Hartley entered the highway on a road 
coming from the east and was driving up the hill going 
north, in the outside lane, at about 15 miles per hour, 
as she testified. Chapman was also going north up the 
hill and at the time of the collision with the Hartley car 
he was about one foot west of the dividing line between 
the two north traffic lanes. He was traveling 35 miles 
per hour. 
Chapman had been on the road all day, starting early 
in the morning at Woods Cross with a load to Panguitch 
and reaching the scene of the accident on his return jour-
ney. He saw the Hartley car come up to the stop sign 
and then proceed up the hill in the east lane. He was then 
driving in the east lane. As he drew toward the Hartley 
car he moved over into the inside lane so as to pass her. 
He was going 35 miles per hour. When he reached a 
point almost parallel with the Hartley car, the latter 
wavered and slipped and went into a spin into Chapman's 
lane and the semi-trailer collided with the Hartley auto-
mobile. The latter was thrown clockwise to the right and 
came to rest facing south near the east guard rail; Chap-
man lost control of his vehicle and it diagonaled across 
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the south bound lanes, collided with the west guard rail 
and stopped so as to block both lanes. 
Denison coming down the hill in the west lane, as 
far over as he could get, saw the lights of the semi-trailer 
as it commenced to cross over, and, feeling that something 
was amiss and that danger threatened, switched off his 
ignition and attempted to bring his vehicle to a stop. 
The highway on the hill was covered with a coat of 
ice, and was very slippery clear across the pavement and 
from the crest to the foot. 
The trailer came across so suddenly and the road was 
so slippery that Denison was unable to bring his station 
wagon to a stop. He could not pass to the right because of 
the guard rail and a deep gulch; he could not pass to his 
left because the trailer blocked both lanes and he could 
not face oncoming traffic in the east lanes. So he sat tight 
and collided with the trailer. 
The action is against Chapman, driver of the oil tanker, 
the Continental Oil Company, owner and employer, and 
Dora Hartley, driver of the third vehicle. 
The theory of appellant's case is that both Chapman 
and Mrs. Hartley were negligent in the operation of their 
vehicles and that as a proximate result thereof the appel-
lant sustained his damages and injuries. 
At the close of our case in chief the court, on motions 
of respondents, took the case from the jury and dismissed 
our complaint, holding that we had failed to produce any 
evidence from which the jury might find that either Chap-
man or Mrs. Hartley was negligent in any manner; and 
that the whole series of events was the result of some ac-
cident; hence there was no liability. 
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Appellant feels that there was ample evidence to take 
the case to the jury on the issues of negligence and proxi-
mate cause; and therefore the court erred in granting the 
motions and dismissing the complaint. So we present to 
this court the evidence relating to those issues and invoke 
the ruling of this court as to its sufficiency. 
The following is a summary of the testimony of the 
witnesses relating to such issues: 
1. Richard H. Levin testified: (Tr. 7) 
He is a Provo City police officer; was on duty the 
evening of this accident. Shortly before the accident he 
drove up the hill and turned around and was waiting 
for the traffic to clear so that he could return back south 
at the time Denison drove out from Orem, and came down 
the hill behind the Denison car but did not see the collision, 
but when he got to the top of the grade he could see 
there had been an accident. (Tr. 10) Other cars were 
there ahead of him. The oil truck was angled in and locked 
onto the guard rail with its front bumper. The station 
wagon had collided with the truck just forward of the 
traction wheels of the traction unit, between the first and 
second pair of wheels. (Tr. 11) 
The highway was very icy. It was slick enough that 
a car coming to a stop on the hill and then trying to 
proceed ahead would have quite a little trouble getting 
traction. The sheet of ice extended from the top to the 
bottom of the hill. There was no snow on top of the ice. 
(Tr. 16) 
The right hand wheels of the Denison vehicle were 
over the edge of the pavement and on the gravel shoulder. 
(Tr. 16) Witness talked with both Chapman and Mrs. 
Hartley. Chapman said he was going around 30 to 35 
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Her car was damaged on the front fender and front 
wheel, a dent in the back door, and a small dent on the 
rear fender, 
6. Alvin D. Chapman testified: 
He had driven that day from Woods Cross to Pan-
guitch and back to Provo. He had taken no rest but coffee 
stops and about an hour and a half to unload. (Tr. 84) 
As he approached the hill he saw Mrs. Hartley pull 
up to the stop sign and stop before entering the highway. 
He had come up the hill in the right hand lane; but when 
he saw her pull into the highway and turn north in that 
lane, he pulled over into the left lane. (Tr. 86) 
The whole surface of the highway was covered with 
slick ice, (Tr. 87) from guard rail to guardrail It was 
a very dangerous condition to drive on. Mrs. Hartley did 
not seem to be having any trouble when he pulled over. 
He testified at the trial that he didn't increase his 
speed on the hill to pass Hartley. (Tr. 88) 
But in his deposition he testified that when he first 
saw her he was going about 20 to 25 miles per hour. (Tr. 
88) and that after he first saw her he increased his speed 
and was going about 35 miles when he overtook her and 
at the time of the collision with her car. (Tr. 89) He did 
see her car the instant before the impact. (Tr. 90) He did 
not see her in the spin. (Tr. 91) He imagined he was 
right close to the back end of her car when she had 
trouble. But he could not see the back end of her car. 
He did not recollect whether or not he saw the Hartley 
car go into the spin. (Tr. 92) He did not remember 
whether he tried to turn to his left to avoid the collision. 
(Tr. 93) 
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He admitted in his direct examination that he had 
testified as follows on his deposition: 
"Guess we were about three-quarters of the 
way up the hill and I don't know what happened 
to her car, but the first thing I knew she was com-
ing back down the hill, either backwards or side-
ways and we collided," (Tr. 97) 
"and we collided and when her car hit the 
front of my truck, it just hit the bumper and the 
f
 front wheel and evidently the front tire because 
: I lost control of the truck and it skidded across 
the road sideways and I hit the guardrail and the 
truck slipped up the guardrail kinda so my truck 
was sitting on an angle and my trailer was follow-
ing up the road. My trailer was out in the middle 
of the road and my truck was across the two lanes." 
(Tr.97) 
He testified on cross examination by his own attorney 
that a speed of 35 miles per hour was safer for him than 
15 miles because of the danger of a spin-out at the lower 
speed. (Tr. 105) 
7. Roland Lavar Denison testified: 
His car was in good condition; the brakes and steer-
ing apparatus were in good working order; he had winter 
tires on the rear wheels. (Tr. 114) The road was slick 
in spots before he came to the top of the hill going south; 
from the top of the hill on down it was slick all over. (Tr. 
116) About a quarter of a mile before he came to the 
top of the hill he took his foot off the gas and the car 
slowed down. (Tr. 117) Just before he got to the guard 
rail he noticed another car was slipping, he could see it 
in another car's lights, and he shifted into second at that 
point, which was about 12 feet north of the west guard[ 
rail. He tried to brake but the car kept going. (Tr. 118-
119) The car which he observed was weaving in another 
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car's lights was in the east lane of traffic. The car was 
just slipping back and forth, not spinning. (Tr. 120) It 
was clear over on the east side of the highway. The road 
was clear of traffic ahead of him. (Tr. 121) When he 
went into second gear his car slowed down; he thought he 
was going
 v25 miles per hour or slower when he made the 
shift. (Tr. 122) The next thing he noticed the truck was 
coming across the road, so he turned off his ignition switch. 
There was nothing more to do. "We hit." He thought 
the truck was 50 to 60 feet ahead of him when he saw 
it coming across the road. He did not see the collision 
between the truck and the Hartley car, nor did he hear 
it. (Tr. 123) He did not try to turn around the truck to 
his left because he might collide with northbound cars. 
He was on the right side of the road as far as he could 
go. (Tr. 124) 
He did not at any time travel at 35 miles per hour 
after he passed the turn-off road, which was about 782 
feet north of the crest of the hill where you can see the 
rest of the highway. (Tr. 137-138) From the crest of the 
hill where you can see on down the road to the point of 
collision is 1,312 feet. (Tr. 139) The sum of those distances 
is 2,094 feet. At no time did he travel at 35 miles per 
hour in that distance. (Tr. 139) 
8. Douglas Denison testified: 
He is 11 years old; was riding in the station wagon 
with his father. Before they came to the road that turns 
off the car was going 35 miles per hour by the speedometer. 
(Tr. 148) His father shifted gears before they got to the 
guard rail. (Tr. 148-149) After he shifted his father cut 
off the motor. (Tr. 150 About 200 feet before the colli-
sion he noticed the speedometer; it was not over 15 miles 
per hour. (Tr. 151-155) **"*" - -
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II. 
A R G U M E N T 
Point 1. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO TAKE 
THE CASE TO THE JURY ON THE ISSUES OF NEG-
LIGENCE AND PROXIMATE CAUSE; HENCE THE 
COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENTS' 
MOTIONS AND IN DISMISSING THE COMPLAINT. 
Plaintiff was driving carefully, well within the esti-
mated safe limit for the place. He slowed down at the 
turn-off, which is about a quarter of a mile back of the 
crest of the hill where one can see the highway clear down 
to the foot. When he came to where he could see down 
the slope he shifted into second gear, and used his brakes 
as much as they could be used on the ice. His brakes were 
in good condition and he had winter tires on the rear 
wheels. He was driving on the extreme west lane, with 
his right hand wheels on the gravel shoulder feeling for 
traction. When he saw the Hartley car, over in the east 
lane, weaving in the light of the truck, he felt there might 
be trouble, so he turned off his ignition and continued 
his efforts to slow down by the use of his brakes. He had 
the right-of-way in his lane. No one had any right to cut 
in ahead of him from the east at that place and block 
him off from proceeding down the hill. He had a right 
to assume that no one would do so. He was alert to what 
was going on, or so the jury might well have inferred, 
and paying careful attention to the situation, the road 
ahead and the traffic. The truck cut in ahead of him, 
collided with the guard rail and stopped, blocking both 
lanes of south bound traffic. It came across when plaintiff 
was within about 50 feet of the point of impact. There 
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was not anything that plaintiff could do to avoid the 
collision. He was not negligent. 
It is otherwise with respect to respondents. A colli-
sion occurred on the two lanes of north bound traffic 
between the truck and Hartley's car. The north bound 
lanes were of ample width to accommodate both vehicles, 
with room to spare. Mrs. Hartley for at least part of 
the distance after she entered the highway traveled well 
over on the east side. Chapman started up the hill in the 
east lane but moved over into the other lane to pass her. 
He was traveling 35 miles per hour. She said she thought 
she might have been going 15 or 20. The police officers 
testified that in their judgment 15 or 20 was the maximum 
safe speed at that place. The hill was covered with a slick 
coat of ice, from guard rail to guard rail and from the 
top to the bottom. Both drivers knew of this condition. 
It was apparent to them as soon as they started up. 
It was not as if one or the other had suddenly come 
upon a slick spot in an otherwise safe surface, or a pot 
hole in a pavement which could not be seen until a driver 
was too close to slow down or turn to avoid being thrown 
off course, or spot of gravel in an otherwise firm surface. 
It was a dangerous highway at that place and both 
drivers were well aware of the dangers. 
There was no traffic immediately ahead of them, to 
their rear, or on either side to distract their attention. 
Their vehicles collided within a foot of the dividing 
line between the north traffic lanes, as Chapman was in 
the act of passing the Hartley car. The jury might well 
have believed that there was plenty of room in his own 
lane for Chapman to turn to his left to avoid a collision; 
and that he should have done so, and that he was negli-
gent for not doing so. 
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It was Chapman's duty in overtaking and passing Hart-
ley to pass to her left at a safe distance. Sec. 41-6-55, UCA, 
1953. 
It was also his duty to drive at a speed no greater 
than was reasonable and prudent under the conditions 
and having regard to the actual and potential hazards 
then existing, and to control his speed as was necessary 
to avoid colliding with the other vehicle. Sec. 41-6-46, 
UCA, 1953. 
The jury had a right to find that Chapman did not 
overtake and attempt to pass Hartley at a safe distance; 
and to conclude therefrom that he was negligent in this 
respect, which negligence was the cause of the collision 
with the Hartley car and also with plaintiff's station wagon. 
The jury had the right to find and conclude that the 
speed of 35 miles per hour was greater than was reason-
able and prudent under the conditions and having regard 
to the actual and potential hazards then existing, and that 
he failed to control his speed to the extent necessary to 
avoid colliding with the Hartley car. If they so found, then 
this was negligence as a matter of law, being in violation 
of the statute. The jury had the right, furthermore, to find 
and conclude that this negligence was a proximate cause 
of the collision between the truck and the station wagon. 
At the trial Chapman testified that he did not ob-
serve the Hartley car immediately before the collision, 
his attenion being centered on the business of keeping the 
truck going and on the road ahead. But he also admitted 
that he had testified in his deposition that he saw the 
Hartley car sliding down the hill toward him immediately 
before the collision and that he did nothing to avoid a 
collision. From this and the other evidence the jury might 
well have concluded and found that Chapman was negli-
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gent for not paying attention to the Hartley car, which 
was having trouble making the grade, and in failing to 
turn to his left or to slow his speed to avoid the accident; 
or the jury might have found that he in fact did see the 
Hartley car going into the slide toward his lane and that 
he was negligent in not taking any measures to avoid the 
accident. If he saw the Hartley car, over on the east side 
of the east lane, waving about and sliding toward his lane 
and even sliding back toward him, the jury had the right 
to find that he was negligent in not turning to his left in 
an attempt to avoid a collision. 
It taxes credulity to believe that the accident could 
have happened if both Chapman and Hartley had been 
driving with due care communsurate with the hazards 
which they both knew existed. 
It is a fact that both these drivers failed to keep con-
trol of their vehicles. The jury had the right to find that 
they were negligent for such failure. The jury had the 
right to find that Mrs. Hartley was negligent for even 
trying to negotiate the hill at the time, for it is apparent 
from her own testimony that she experienced great diffi-
culy in keeping her car under control almost from the 
moment she entered the highway. The jury had a right 
to find that due care on her part in the dangerous situa-
tion in which she found herself required that she pull 
over to the side of the road and stop, instead of fighting 
the wheel and trying to make the grade. 
It is manifest from the evidence that Hartley and Chap-
man by the operation of their vehicles set in motion a chain 
of events which led directly to the collision between the 
station wagon and the truck and to the resulting damages 
to the plaintiff. If Hartley had been driving with due 
care, if Chapman had not been traveling so fast or if 
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he had been paying attention and had even tried to avoid 
a collision, when he saw, if he did see, the Hartley car 
sliding down the hill toward him, then this accident would 
not have happened. 
It is in evidence that other drivers had successfully 
negotiated that hill immediately before and immediately 
after this accident. There is no evidence that any other 
drivers were involved in accidents there. So it was not 
impossible to drive up or down the hill. If others could 
drive successfully over that dangerous highway, it is not 
unreasonable to conclude that Chapman and Hartley could 
have done so by the exercise of due care. 
It is our contention that there was ample evidence 
to take the case to the jury upon the two issues, namely, 
(1) the negligence of Chapman and Hartley; and (2) that 
such negligence was the proximate cause of the collision 
between the truck and the station wagon and of the re-
sulting damage to plaintiff. Hence that the court was in 
error in sustaining the defendants' motions and in dismis-
sing the complaint. The court held as a matter of law 
that the evidence showed that there was no negligence 
and that the collisions were wholly accidental and that 
there was no liability. 
The evidence shows how Chapman was operating and 
the speed of the truck; how Hartley was struggling to get 
her vehicle up the hill; the highly dangerous condition of 
the road, of which both of them were aware and saw 
before they commenced the ascent. It was for the 
jury to say whether either or both exercised due care in 
th circumstances; and if not, whether the negligence found 
was a proximate cause of the damages to plaintiff. These 
are conclusions of fact to be found by the jury, not con-
clusions of law to be decided by the court. In deciding 
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them as matters of law, the court usurped the functions 
of the jury and denied plaintiff of his right to the judgment 
of eight citizens on the issues. 
There are hundreds of cases in the books in which the 
subject of skidding motor vehicles is involved. Questions 
of negligence and proximate cause have been raised in 
almost every conceivable manner. They all differ on the 
facts. We find none that can be said to be of controlling 
weight in this case. We point the way to some of them 
by citing: 
Barret, et al. v. Caddo Transfer & Warehouse 
Company, Inc., 165 La. 1075, 116 So. 563, 58 
A. L. R. 261; and the annotation commencing at 
page 264 of the latter volume. 
Megan v. Stevens, et al., 91 F. (2d) 419; 113 
A. L. R. 992; and the annotation in the latter 
volume commencing at page 1002. 
It is urged that the case should have been submitted, 
to the jury under the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur even 
though the Court had determined the matters foregoing 
against the plaintiff Denison. The facts surrounding this 
case clearly present a situation bringing into application 
the doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur, The icy condition upon 
the hill was not a sudden one presented only upon the 
hill but was generally prevalent. The defendent Chapman 
was acrossed the path of the plaintiff in the south-bound 
traffic lanes which could only have been the result of 
someones negligence. The oil tanker was under the ex-
clusive control of the defendant Chapman and there was 
no negligent act on the part of Denison which created 
the situation. 
Barrera v. De La Torre 300 P2 100, California. 
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It is respectfully submitted that the court erred in 
taking the case from the jury and dismissing the com-
plaint; and therefore the judgment should be reversed and 
appellant granted a new trial 
Respectfully submitted. 
Dilworth Woolley 
Manti, Utah 
Warren M. O'Gara 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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